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In this essay Professor Deutsch addresses the question whether
the legal system can make modern corporations accountable to so-
cietal ideals. Whether one believes the modern corporation can be
made amenable to the popular will through law may depend upon
one's conception of what defines and motivates the activities of indi-
vidual citizens as members of the polity. In this context Professor
Deutsch analyzes the Marxist conception of human se/f-definition
and argues that one can understand both the persistence of corpo-
rate power and the possibility of controlling that power through law
only by recognizing a richer conception of human se/f-definition.
I.
When I was a student, my corporations teacher often asked
whether we had ever seen a corporation walking down the street. The
query was devastating. We had learned quickly that, given the costs of
litigation, the demands of profit maximization meant that corporate
lawyers were paid to keep matters out of court, rather than to make law
or right injustice, and that the principles of corporate law consequently
were contained in remarkably few decided cases. But if those few deci-
sions concerned an entity that existed only in the eyes of the law, it
became increasingly difficult to avoid the conclusion that law, as it was
applied in fact, was too artificial and uncertain to function as an effec-
tive control on corporate power.
That position was not a difficult one to take when I was a student.
Existentialists proposed that the existence of things, and not their es-
sence (or meaning), was all that one could grasp. A generation that
solemnly accepted that proposition as a philosophical truth naturally
would be disturbed that corporations were neither seen nor heard. It
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was but a short step from existentialism as a philosophical doctrine to
acceptance of the reality presented in Hemingway's novels: a focus on
the tangible, a view of the meaning of life as realized in action rather
than thought and feeling, and the definition of a good life as the stylish
demonstration of personal strength.
A focus on personal strength inevitably involved us in an ambiva-
lent attitude toward combat. Hemingway's Farewell to Arms was our
text on the futility of the war to end all wars. Yet For Whom the Bell
Tolls was testimony that fighting for some things gave meaning to
existence. For us, however, it was the Korean War-a conflict whose
significance was as ambiguous as whether its resolution should be
counted a victory or a defeat-that in the end provided the context in
terms of which we defined ourselves. It was this context that enabled
us to see Perlman v. Feldmann' as the case that, if properly understood,
embodied all of corporate law.
Feldmann sold his controlling interest in a steel manufacturing
corporation at a premium well above the market price shortly after the
Korean War had begun. The purchaser was a corporation whose
stockholders were users of steel. A shareholder sued, arguing that
Feldmann, instead of selling, should have consummated the merger he
had been negotiating prior to the sale of his stock interest. The first
decision produced by the controversy, Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp. ,2 held that claims of fraudulent mismanagement did not give ju-
risdiction under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1
which bars fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of the corpo-
ration's stock. We read that decision as an example of the conceptually
inadequate but politically necessary doctrinal distinctions required by
the coexistence of dual state and federal sovereignties that made law in
our federal system.
The transaction having withstood attack under standards embod-
ied in the federal statutes, the Second Circuit held, in Perlman, that
part of the premium received for control of the corporation constituted
a violation of the controlling shareholder's common law fiduciary du-
ties.4 Given that steel was in short supply because of the Korean con-
flict, and that Feldmann took advantage of the resulting shortage, we
could understand the result. Nor was it a surprise, in light of the con-
1. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
2. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
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ceptual inadequacies of the Birnbaum rationale, that when the Second
Circuit was faced with the need to describe control (a concept that de-
fined the scope of the Perlman duty), a three-judge panel wrote three
separate opinions which agreed only that there should be a full hearing
in the district court.'
In a memorial essay dedicated to him, the example given of my
corporations teacher's "substantive . . . sophistica[tion]" is his view of
Perlman as "a freak case arising out of a failure of the pricing system to
allocate resources."6
One can cite the prominent place of economic analysis in current
law school curricula to justify characterizing reliance on economic ter-
minology as "substantive sophistication" in analyzing the meaning of a
judicial opinion. As lawyers learned during the New Deal, the use of
expertise in procedural intricacies to justify substantive judicial deci-
sions can be matched by the use of expertise in economic models to
justify substantive administrative determinations. The essay written in
honor of my teacher itself proposes that the problems created by share-
holders' appraisal remedies be reset "into functional economic terms"
and that "[i]f we are to have the remedy at all, the key point on which it
should turn is the presence or absence of a market."7
How one determines the presence or absence of a market is an
issue regarded as either so obvious or so technical that nothing need be
said, just as no definition of "control" was attempted in Perlman. The
analyses both in the memorial essay and in the Perlman opinion re-
main persuasive, however, despite failure even to adumbrate a concept
fundamental to the result reached. The reason is captured in one of the
essay's closing observations:
The dissenter's appraisal statutes are not remarkable as ma-
terial for the crusader or reformer. Their major interest is intel-
lectual.
Altogether, we can live along with the status quo under the
appraisal statutes as they now are. They are in sickly condition.
But in a world as awry as this one, they do not loom very impor-
tant."
A situation is acceptable, in other words, as long as its conse-
quences are not regarded as sufficiently important to justify the effort
required in changing the law or the socioeconomic structure. In terms
5. Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
6. Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essayfor Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J.
223, 225 (1962).
7. Id. at 260, 261.
8. Id. at 262 (paragraphs reversed in original).
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of corporate power, for example, the cost of a mass-produced item to
the consumer remains acceptable as long as the amount involved re-
mains sufficiently small in terms of the consumer's total expenditures.
Of course, the objection may be raised that consumers can unite to
force the reduction of an unjustifiably inflated price, in which case the
number of interested consumers required for an effective alliance
would be only those who consume an amount of the product sufficient
to make the amount by which corporate profits might be decreased
both a matter of more than marginal interest and sufficiently large to
cover costs of their organization.
Given his postulate that humans define themselves in economic
terms, Marx could argue that the consumers constitute a potential class
and that capitalist corporate power, since it represents the real interest
of a very small group, will disappear once all socioeconomic classes
have realized their interests. What this Article contends is that a more
complex paradigm of self-definition than that proposed by Marx, a
paradigm that encompasses groupings other than socioeconomic
classes, permits explication of both the persistence of corporate power
and the factors that make the multinational corporation a peculiarly
disturbing phenomenon in the world of today.
II.
The paradigm I propose is that of humans as social animals in a
sense more comprehensive than the economic. The fundamentally
human attribute-the only characteristic in terms of which we are
wholly equal-is that of self-aware mortality. Our behavioral response
to that characteristic is a purely individual matter, a fact that forms the
basis for the existentialist argument that one cannot validly grasp the
meaning of one's life prior to one's death. With respect to every other
characteristic, however, we def'ne ourselves in terms of group member-
ship-we focus on qualities that make us more like some humans and
less like others. An individual may feel that the meaning of his exist-
ence is entirely restricted to achieving the qualities characteristic of a
particular group existing at a given time and place. Even those quali-
ties may well undergo change if the group succeeds in achieving its
goals. Moreover, as long as an individual identifies himself with more
than one group, realization of the interests of any given group will ful-
fill only some of the goals in terms of which he determines the meaning
of his life.
Marxism as a philosophical doctrine, an oversimplification of the
Hegelian thought from which it was developed, restricts historically rel-
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evant group membership to that of socioeconomic class. What that
oversimplification makes possible, however, is a view of human history
as a wholly understandable process, a vision that would allow all
humans to know, and therefore act upon, their real interests. The fact
is, however, that when people behave, they believe they are acting in
accordance with their intentions. As a result, even a socioeconomic
analysis of group behavior is incomplete in the absence of a political
component that describes the ways in which groups attempt to imple-
ment their intentions.
Marxism's oversimplification of Hegelian thought lies in the claim
that socioeconomic terms are sufficient for an analysis of the political
component of human behavior. What makes the oversimplification ac-
ceptable is the elusive meaning Hegelian thought assigns to the politi-
cal component. The concrete manifestation of political meaning is
variously referred to as Spirit, World Spirit, or the Absolute. The last
of these designations expresses the conjunction of the particular with
the universal, the actualization of a synthesis of thesis and antithesis.
As the first two designations make clear, however, it is impossible,
given separate political entities, to determine at any particular moment
whether the currently prevailing synthesis constitutes an international
consensus or the will of a dominant state. The political component of
human behavior, in short, though a necessary part of any complete
description of human behavior, cannot be grasped in solely descriptive
terms.
The solution to this dilemma is to use metaphor, while remaining
aware that the figure of speech may be inaccurate. Given Hegel's
background as a theological student, for example, I would argue that
political power in Hegelian thought performs the functions assigned by
theology to the Divine Will and I would point to the fact that monarchs
were legitimately invested with authority only when they were anointed
as providing historical justification for use of this metaphor at the time
Hegel was writing. Since relatively few of today's political entities are
monarchies, however, the metaphor I propose to be relevant is God as
Father rather than God as King.
Much of Western political philosophy can be viewed as a succes-
sion of interpretations of what Plato meant to convey in the dialogue
known as The Republic. Consequently, I choose that dialogue as the
context in which to apply the metaphor of political actors-whether
individuals or entities-as members of an extended family. From a
Marxist perspective, what is crucial about the society The Republic
prescribes is that it consists solely of a small elite subsisting on the labor
781
HeinOnline -- 58 Tex. L. Rev. 781 1979-1980
Texas Law Review
of a vastly larger number of humans consigned to slavery. It is pre-
cisely this separation of politics and the economic task of securing a
livelihood, however, that makes it possible for The Republic to serve as
such an all-encompassing textbook of political reality. Thus, in inter-
personal terms, the structure of Greek society permitted active political
participants to know each other as full human beings rather than solely
in their political or economic roles. What this social situation contrib-
utes to the metaphor is that, just as the Greek gods could be viewed
either as a squabbling family or as aspects of a single human being, so
The Republic can be read as a metaphor either for a single human be-
ing or a political entity.
It is the absence of a distinction between public and private self
that makes the philosopher-king simultaneously a person who focuses
his activities solely on grasping the essence of philosophical concepts
and a politician recognized as a leader because he is trusted to achieve
the life agreed upon as desirable by all. Once political power involved
something more than concrete, individual human beings, however, its
meaning became a matter more abstract than individual responsibility
for the nature of one's life. As the franchise widened, political respon-
sibility increasingly became a matter attributed to abstract entities
rather than specific individuals. The office, in short, became eternal,
although its occupants could not draw upon that attribute to surmount
their own mortality.
III.
That the perspective on human self-definition developed thus far
helps in explicating the law of corporations is a proposition that can be
tested only by examining cases. In re Radom and Neidorff Inc.,' de-
cided by the New York Court of Appeals in 1954, was described by
Professor Chayes as an example of the "judicial solicitude for the lives
of fictional persons, creatures of the law, . . . that reduces the brave
new close-corporation lawyer to a helpless rage."'" In that case the
Court of Appeals upheld a lower court's refusal to entertain a petition
for dissolution of a corporation, despite the existence of a statute specif-
ically authorizing those petitions and a history of bitter conflict be-
tween the two stockholders.
Radom and Neidorff had run a successful business for thirty years.
Radom, however, had long had unfriendly relations with his sister,
9. 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954).
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Anna, who was married to Neidorff. When the latter died, brother and
sister became the sole and equal stockholders in the company. Ra-
dom's petition for dissolution occasioned the controversial decision of
the Court of Appeals. Although Professor Chayes obviously does not
find the court's opinion persuasive, he suggests that the result might be
justifiable because the brother offered his sister $75,000 for her interest
shortly after her husband's death; three years later accumulated profits
were $242,000, and a court-ordered dissolution would have produced
no more than $300,000 for the two stockholders. "But Radom," con-
cludes Chayes, "would have had the going-concern value, since he had
the skill and associations to continue to operate the business while his
'partner's' widow did not. Surely, when they organized the business the
two men did not contemplate this kind of bet on survivorship."
This analysis is striking, for several reasons: the result it approves
remains one impossible to reconcile with the governing statute; nothing
in the corporate documents contravened the existence of a bet; and the
absence of any documentary evidence normally would place at least
the burden of going forward on the sister opposing the petition. Insofar
as the analysis is nevertheless persuasive, I suggest it is because of the
reliance on numbers, which seem real because they cannot be affected
by the wishes or desires of the individuals involved. The Marxist focus
on accumulated capital as the source of individual human alienation is
persuasive because the numbers in terms of which capital is presented
are, in this symbolic sense, not only real but of equal applicability to all
human situations.
What makes both Marxism and the justification offered for the
Radom result inadequate is that much of human behavior, whether or
not provoked by or responding to economic pressures, cannot accu-
rately be reduced to numbers. If the Radom result can be justified, the
determinative issue is how brother and sister should treat each other,
rather than what two businessmen might or might not have wagered.
Applying the language of relationship to the context of Perlman v. Feld-
mann, the generation facing the ambiguity inherent in the Korean con-
flict resolved it by acting on the conviction that the interests of the
United States were sufficiently related to those of South Korea to jus-
tify the efforts required to protect Korea from an expansion of Soviet
power.
Post-1950s generations drew from the thought of Herbert Mar-
l1. Id. at 1547.
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cuse 12 a generalization of this opposition to the expansion of the power
wielded by organized institutions. The generalization was that all bu-
reaucracies have the identical impact of severely restricting the individ-
ual autonomy of persons over whom they exercise control, and that
expansion of bureaucratic power-whether abroad or at home, whether
Communist or capitalist-therefore necessarily represents, at worst,
tyranny, and, at best, unjust domination in the name of benevolent tu-
telage.
Such an argument, of course, assumes that all bureaucracies, like a
Communist Party in a communist state, are immune from the account-
ability imposed by a court of law. Since the generalization encom-
passes private and economic as well as public and political
bureaucracies, however, it also requires the assumption that the only
important economic problem is how to achieve equitable distribution
or allocation. As long as an increase in the availability of material
goods broadens individual autonomy, in other words, the restrictions
imposed on individual behavior by bureaucracies charged with the pro-
duction and distribution of material goods may be both necessary and,
in social terms, benevolent.
This increase in the availability of material goods does, howeer,
have significant social consequences. Thus, as more and more re-
sources are devoted to mass production, the relative cost of goods read-
ily distinguishable from those mass-produced rises, eventually making
conspicuous consumption of material goods a prohibitively expensive
mechanism for the definition of personal identity. One consequence of
this economic process, as is apparent in demonstrations staged for the
media, is that personal identity is in more and more instances defined
by the presentation of self to the public as a member of a group wholly
devoted to a particular political goal. The particular goal in question,
usually embodied in a symbol sufficiently compelling to persuade indi-
viduals to engage in the group activity, is often a response to arbitrary
application of otherwise legitimate political power. Such protests often
succeed in changing the status quo by imposing effective limits on the
use of political power; most of these protests, however, are too short-
lived to create new symbols sufficiently effective to justify application
of political power in situations other than the one that led to the pro-
test. Continuation of a shift of the behavior in terms of which individu-
als define themselves from the economic to the political sphere, because
12. Eg., H. MARCUSE, ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN (1964).
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it would produce more demonstrations, might therefore deplete the
stock of effective political symbols available to the society.
A decline in the number of effective political symbols would result
in a shift of power away from political entities; the contexts for social
activities structured by political symbols, and therefore political au-
thorities, would decrease, possibly to be replaced by contexts structured
by corporate hierarchies. In any event, it is less likely that political
authorities would be able effectively to control corporate activity. Even
if this shift does not occur, however, the amount of political and eco-
nomic power wielded by corporations today makes the question of
their governance a significant one. The question presented, therefore,
is whether any legal system can make possible effective regulation of
the governance of corporate bureaucracies.
IV.
In 1955 the New York Court of Appeals wrote Rosenfeld v.
Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corp.,3 a decision that appears to be a
conscious attempt to create a common law governing the political as-
pects of competition for corporate control. The question presented
concerned the use of corporate funds by both incumbent management
and successful insurgents in their proxy contest. A majority of four
refused to accept the three-person dissent that treated as legal only
those corporate expenditures "incurred in giving widespread notice to
stockholders of questions affecting the welfare of the corporation," 4
presumably because that holding would have prevented incumbent
management from using corporate resources even for the purpose of
making a contest with insurgents, who were not so limited, an equal
one in financial terms. 5
The formula written into law by the majority distinguishes be-
tween "personal power" and "policy" contests, and permits corporate
funds to be spent only on the latter. 6 As in all attempts to create for-
mulas effectively to control human behavior, the Rosenfeld words are
sufficiently general to permit opportunities for evasion. However, the
view of law dominant in the 1950s-centered at Harvard and embodied
in the scholarly work of Henry Hart and the judicial opinions of Felix
Frankfurter-stressed the primary importance of the process of creat-
ing rules rather than their substantive context. The fourth member of
13. 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955).
14. Id. at 185, 128 N.E.2d at 300 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting, joined by Dye & Fuld, JJ.).
15. Id. at 172-73, 128 N.E.2d at 293.
16. Id. at 173-74, 128 N.E.2d at 293.
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the Rosenfeld majority, in a concurring opinion that demonstrates the
possibility of focusing on process in arriving at a substantive result,
rests on a technical ruling concerning allocation of the burden of
proof. 7 The final comment of that opinion, however, leaves open the
possibility that situations may arise in which proxy campaign expendi-
tures will be "intrinsically unlawful,"' 8 thus raising questions, not
about the applicability of the majority's formula, but about the mean-
ing of the precedent in which it was announced.
Whatever one reads the Rosenfeld rationale to mean, the fact is
that few courts have applied the formula it promulgated because, as a
recent California opinion put it, "every contest involves or can be made
to involve issues of policy.'' 9 The relevant issue raised by the govern-
ance of corporate bureaucracies, therefore, is not whether the proper
content of the judicial formula or the appropriate process leading to its
promulgation can be established, but whether the formula will in fact
be applied.
A situation in which judicially promulgated rules will be applied
requires for its existence individuals for whom the advantages obtained
from continued membership in the groups by which they define them-
selves (whether those groups be ethnic, religious, political, economic or
vocational) are outweighed by the commitment to hold corporate enti-
ties to the goals prescribed by societal ideals-ideals that include a cor-
porate promise, when the State recognizes its existence, of obedience to
law. The burden faced by these individuals, whether lawyers or plain-
,tiffs, is the awareness that the lawsuit they are initiating may Well be
based on so individual a weighting of values that it proves unaccept-
able to the court and/or the relevant groups. Marxists in the German
legislature at the turn of this century, for example, were the predomi-
nant representatives of proletarian political interests in Europe. Yet
each of them joined in voting credits for the conduct of World War I,
thus placing loyalty to the country and the party above an important
promise of Marxism to the working class: release from the obligation
to fight other proletarians in bourgeois wars.
The Marxist definition of proletarian interests is incomplete, this
Article has argued, precisely because it defines out of existence the po-
litical component of that concept. If my analysis of Hegelian thought is
correct, however, that Hegel substituted the State for God as the ab-
straction into which the individual projects his need to control reality,
17. Id. at 175, 128 N.E.2d at 294 (Desmond, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 176, 128 N.E.2d at 295.
19. Braude v. Havenner, 38 Cal. App. 3d 526, 532, 113 Cal. Rptr. 386, 389 (1974).
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then even a definition that takes the political component into account
will simply be changing the rhetoric that describes a persistent mystery.
What this substitution of terminology would prevent is the individual
self-awareness that may prove necessary if we are to use the legal sys-
tem to impose effective checks on the power wielded by corporate bu-
reaucracies.
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